The European Movement and French Europeanism during the de Gaulle Presidency
From General de Gaulle's 1958 return to power in the wake of the events in Algeria until his retirement in 1969, the European integration process was strongly influenced by the choices of the Fifth Republic. This was certainly due to Paris's traditionally key role in Old Continent affairs but also to the dynamism of the new French leadership, driven by a desire to restore the country's significant and decisive role in international and European politics I .
The aim of this essay is to analyse the stance of European Movement International modern world, which even at that time were providing the impetus to overcome this view in order to create, at least in Western Europe, a supranational and integrated order. Gaullist political doctrine actually offered a solution to these two contrasting needs by proposing a confederation model for Europe which, acknowledging that only legitimate entities could remain states, envisaged a form of political and economic union based on institutionalised intergovernmental cooperation and respect for the absolute sovereignty of the contracting parties.
Specifically regarding the relationship between Gaullism and movements for European unity, it should be immediately noted that General De Gaulle's ascent to power led to a weakening of federalist and Europeanist movements and organisations in France, except for, of course, the ones supporting the Europe des États model pursued by the new government. As pointed out by Alain Greilsammer (1975) , this occurred for a number of reasons. First of all, the political staff (ministers, members of parliament and senior officials) had become less and less attentive and involved in the initiatives of the federalists.
During the Fourth Republic for many public political figures attending meetings, conferences and public meetings hosted by the federalists in an attempt to garner political and electoral support from these pressure groups was almost considered a duty. However, with de Gaulle's return to power, this practice progressively, yet rather significantly, E -167 federalist organisations lost their influence as they had neither the human resources nor the material means to counter the Gaullist propaganda. Thirdly, federalist organisations often found themselves on the defensive in an attempt to safeguard Community institutions, which, while harbouring some unconcealed doubts about their inadequate level of integration, particularly at the political level, needed to be defended against "assaults" and strict Gaullist initiatives almost as if they were "a fortress under siege" (Greilsammer 1975: 86-87) . Moreover, after the failure of the EDC Treaty, Europeanist and federalist movements suffered deep divisions (Greilsammer 1975: 85-94) .
When the Fifth Republic was created, French Europeanism actually seemed rather diverse, although most of the movements, organisations and groups were part of the Organisation Française du Mouvement Européen (OFME), the national section of EM International, the board of which was made up of, in succession, diplomat André François- -French Federalist Movement La Fédération, founded in 1944 (Greilsammer 1975 Gouzy 1992: 61-89; Bacharan-Gressel 1993: 41-66 Coudenhove-Kalergi 1965; Brugmans 1970: 57-73; Agnelli 1975; Posselt, 1992: 227-236) and was long chaired by former Minister Louis Terrenoire with Georges Pompidou as vicepresident, until he joined the government in 1962.
The Movement for the Independence of Europe was established in 1967 and was a left-leaning, Gaullist movement that was opposed to any supranational development of the Communities. It defined itself as progressive, anti-imperialist and opposed to US policy, which it viewed as hegemonic. Some of its most remarkable members were Emmanuel d'Astier de la Vigerie, René Capitant, Jacques Debu-Bridel as well as others who were close to or members of the French Communist Party, such as Francis Crémieux (Gouzy 1996: 56) .
It is also worth mentioning a few international organisations which, albeit not strictly 
Attitudes Towards de Gaulle's European Policy
Regarding the French Europeanist movements' position on de Gaulle's politics upon his return to power in 1958, it should be noted that in the first three years, from 1958 to 1961, the prevailing approach was based on caution and careful observation, particularly among EM and OFME leaders. General de Gaulle was an enigma and his rise to power had caused mixed reactions within the EM, considering the fact that his first initiatives seemed to presage an attitude in favour of political union.
In order to protect French interests along with other reasons, de Gaulle had not "frozen" the Treaties of Rome, which had entered into force on January 1 st , 1958, a few months before his return to power. He was aware of the need to modernise the French economy by integrating it into a wider market, and was interested in launching the With the final crisis of the Fourth Republic, Faure acknowledged that General de Gaulle's return to power and the birth of a new Republic were necessary steps, due to the difficult situation France found itself in, but failed to conceal his concern regarding the Gaullists' positions on the European integration process (Riondel 1997: 292) . However, after about two months, on September 10 th , 1958 to be exact, the Executive Committee of the OFME adopted a resolution which stated that it regretted that none of the articles in the new draft constitution referred to the development of European construction ('Le Mouvement Européen devant la Constitution' 1958: 3).
La Federation, however, while regretting that municipal and regional decentralisation measures were not covered by the draft constitution, asked that it be voted on because a negative vote would have plunged the country into chaos, possibly resulting in a dictatorship as the exercise of all freedoms depended on the authority of the executive power ('Le Oui du Mouvement Fédéraliste Européen' 1958: 3).
The EFM's aforementioned non-hostile attitude a priori towards the Fifth Republic, was confirmed in the referendum on the draft constitution (Greilsammer 1975: 95-96 Nevertheless, Faure remained cautious and wary, noting that the measures taken until then, especially in the area of trade, had been the simplest ones, also because they were the result of decisions already taken and applied automatically (Riondel 1997: 325-326 
The "Empty Chair Crisis" and the October 1965 EM Congress in Cannes
After the events of the late 1950s and early 1960s, 1965 was a crucial year in the history of the EM and of the European integration process in general due to the outbreak of the aforementioned "empty chair crisis" as defined by historiographers and political journalists.
The EM's reaction -after Gaullists decided to suspend the participation of French government representatives in Community body meetings -was extremely harsh.
In Faure did not conceal his concern about whether the crisis would deal a fatal blow to the balanced evolution of the European integration process. He sensed that the Gaullists' goal was to question the roots of the Community method.
As predicted by Van Schendel, a large Europeanist demonstration took place in Brussels on July 19 th on the initiative of the EM Executive in order to publicly state its reiteration of its desire to achieve the political, economic and social objectives included in the Treaties of Paris and Rome XVII .
The statement underlined that the crisis had revealed a "growing difference in Member
States' views on the political and democratic prospects of the European Community" and The statement went on to specify that the breakdown in negotiations and refusal to continue negotiations were reactions which were not only completely out of proportion with the dissent manifested within the Council, but also "an attack on the Treaty" ('Grande manifestazione europeista a Bruxelles' 1965: 3).
However, the EM declared that it was still "incredulous" of a deliberate willingness to France over the Commission's proposals was to be expected. According to Zijlstra, it was better to do only that which was feasible (i.e., create the customs union as soon as possible)
to avoid risking the failure of the Community experience. A political federation needed to be created gradually as history is subject to ebbs and flows. Therefore, patience and a willingness to compromise were needed at the tactical level in anticipation of "a new tidal In the speech of the President of the Italian Council of the European Movement (CIME), Giuseppe Petrilli, he pointed out that the French position questioned the institutional framework of the Treaty, and it was "clear that, behind the pretexts invoked to justify the breakdown in negotiations, the intention was to reduce European economic integration to a mere customs union with a series of measures supporting individual economic sectors and a return to the traditional formulas of intergovernmental cooperation" (ACIME, 1965 Intervento del Prof. Giuseppe Petrilli: 1-2).
However, the President of CIME added that the attitude adopted by the French was also an easy excuse to justify the hesitations, misunderstandings, lack of cohesion and clarity of other states where European problems were often considered foreign policy issues that should only be addressed by a handful of specialists. Petrilli reiterated that, given the level of development which had been reached by the six countries, economic integration could only succeed if there was also a unified decision-making process (Ibid.: 2-3).
Regarding the EM's role, it was not perceived simply as an advisory body to national governments and the Communities. Rather, the movement's activities needed to be differentiated from those of the government, to better make criticisms and mobilise public opinion. However, according to Malagodi, de Gaulle was not the only one responsible for the crisis, the apathy of the other partners was also to blame. At this point, in addition to the implementation of the Treaties of Paris and Rome, the building of Europe had to go on, even without France, however, always leaving the door open for it, and working hard on the accession of the United Kingdom. Maintaining the Atlantic link was crucial, as was Europe's definition of common objectives at the global level (ACIME, 1965, ANSA nr.
199/2).
The British EM Council, through a memorandum presented to the Congress, asked that UK membership, and that of other countries wishing to join the Community, be put at the centre of political initiative. The British section expressed its full support of extending the Community principle to include foreign policy and defence, as well as the strengthening of the EP, while pointing out that, under the current circumstances, the EM should concentrate its efforts on two priorities: preserving the Communities and ensuring enlargement as quickly as possible (ACIME, 1965 
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The Cannes congress was also characterised by a harsh attack on Count CoudenhoveKalergi and his organisation -the Pan-European Union -, which had now taken, as mentioned above, a clearly pro-de Gaulle stance, and several members of the government party joined the French section of the movement to make their stance even clearer.
Pressured by the federalists, a motion to remove Coudenhove-Kalergi as one of the Honorary Presidents of the EM was prepared, since his stance was getting increasingly closer to de Gaulle's, to the point that he condemned the Brussels' Commission for daring to propose the federal solutions which, in his opinion, had come to undermine "collaboration among states". Because of its delicate nature, this question was not publicly voted on during the conference, but was sent to the Bureau Exécutif (ACIME, 1965 The President of the EM went on to reiterate that the Community should continue to operate under the rules of the Treaties, countering those who wished to overpower the competences, prestige and authority of the Community institutions, primarily its driving force, the Commission, the independent, impartial body responsible for ensuring Community interests as well as those of a state that was in a minority in the Council.
Moreover, in the work of the Commission, it often adopted a moderate, flexible approach to achieve broad consensus on its initiatives. Although the proposals put forward by the Commission in March 1965 seemed too premature for governments to accept, the latter, On the other hand, the Commission, because of its vocation and competences, was expected to be the vanguard and the engine of the Community. It certainly was not expected to step back in its positions, dragged along by other European institutions or national governments (Riondel 1997: 404) . In the end, the participants voted unanimously for three resolutions. The first invited governments to create a common front to safeguard the Community, without seeking "an equally dangerous and illusory compromise" on significant issues (ACIME, 1965 Risoluzioni approvate allo straordinario congresso di Cannes, October 3 rd ). Europe would find neither salvation nor any guarantees for its future without complying with the spirit and letter of the Treaties. It was also asked to resume the regular meetings of the Council, even without France, so all the decisions required and foreseen by the Treaty could be made, particularly regarding budgetary matters, and to examine the Commission's proposals in order to reach a decision as quickly as possible regarding the financial regulation and the outstanding agriculture issues.
A second resolution, defined the enlargement of the EEC as the essential objective of the EEC, and called on governments to reach an agreement on the accession of the democratic countries which were willing and able to undertake the commitments laid down by the Treaty of Rome (Ibid.: 2-3).
Finally, under the third resolution passed by the Congress, the EM decided to launch a public opinion campaign "to demonstrate the value and necessity of common European institutions for the resolution of problems on which the future of new European generations depends" (Ibid.: 3).
The 1965 French Presidential Elections
As for French domestic politics, Faure wanted to create a great centrist rassemblement, with the other five partners on the issue of majority voting, confirmed its right to resort to the veto. The six delegations stated that this discrepancy did not prevent the work of the Community from being resumed according to normal procedure (Loth 2001a (Loth , 2007 Gerbet 1994: 269-284; Levi, Morelli, 1994: 162-163) .
A week earlier, on January 22 nd , 1966, the EM Bureau Exécutif, which met in Brussels, E -183 essential interests of the States. The document also warned against any solutions that compromised, both openly, by revising the Treaties, and indirectly, through agreements defined "interpretive", any progress by reintroducing the right to veto and weakening the Commission. Furthermore, the resolution stressed the importance, once the crisis was over, of opening the Community up to countries which were willing to accept Europe's rules and develop Europe's political unity based on Community principles (ACIME, 1966 Bureau Exécutif International, Réunion du 22 Janvier [...], Procés-Verbal: 5-6; Ibid., Résolution).
Conclusions
The issue analysed highlights the EM as a forum for linking national political dynamics (in this case, French in particular) to supranational and European ones. EM was a movement that safeguarded European Communities against Gaullists' attempts to profoundly change them, even though it was, by nature, characterised by strong internal pluralism. The gradual emergence, both within the OFME and the international movement, of opposition to General de Gaulle's politics did not eliminate internal fractures, i.e., divisions between the sectors of the EM that were in favour of developing Community institutions based on a model of institutional or integral federalism and those that were more oriented towards a functionalist and gradualist approach, not to mention the extremely cautious positions taken in terms of support for a supranational Europe by some national councils, such as the UK and Scandinavian councils. Therefore, EM expressed a plural Europeanism, which conflicted with Gaullist politics not only due to opposition, which was certainly broad and prevalent, to its institutional plan regarding Europe but also due to the positions taken by General de Gaulle on Euro-Atlantic relations, as well as on British accession to the Community. Levi, Morelli (1994: 162-163); and Di Nunno (2012) . IV As for European Movement International, cf. Schöndube (1987: 156-166); Hick (1991; 1992: 171-181) ; Palayret (1994: 365-383; 1996: 151-178; 2000: 743-781 (1996) . VI However, it should also be added that the public contributions to the OFME were significantly reduced. VII At the time, within the French Radical Party there was strong opposition between three components: the one led by René Mayer, joined also by Faure, which was further right on the political spectrum, supported a liberal economy as well as the supranational integration process of Europe; another component that was further left, the leader of which was Pierre Mendès-France, in favour of a command economy and far more cautious on European issues; and, finally, a component, the main exponent of which was Edouard Daladier, that opposed European integration, also because it was wary of Germany. See Riondel (1997: 67-70, 83-87, 117-120, 164-290) . VIII As for the location of the seats of European institutions, the Pan-European Union wanted the Council of Europe to remain in Strasbourg, the European Coal and Steel Community in Luxembourg and the Euratom in Brussels. Cf. 'Réunion du Conseil Central de l'Union Paneuropéenne ' (1958: 7) ; 'Résolution du Conseil Central de l'Union Paneuropéenne ' (1958: 19) . IX See also the Archive of the Italian Council of the European Movement (hereinafter ACIME), Fald. 11, b. EST/6, doc. 70, "Organisation Français du Mouvement Européen", Communiqué. X "[…] The European Federalist Movement wishes to declare that, now more than ever, it is determined to fight, if necessary, against the perilous illusion of presumed national greatness founded upon power. It will continue its struggle, with the same unyielding strength, to create a European federation, which is still the only path to salvation for the peoples of this continent". XI On September 5 th , 1960, de Gaulle presented his proposal for cooperation between the Western European countries in the fields of politics, economics, culture and defence, which included quarterly meetings of the Heads of State and Government and maintained the appointment of members of the European Parliamentary Assembly by national parliaments. The creation of such a union would be subject to European referendum (Riondel 1997: 366-367 ). This proposal was followed by the Fouchet Plans initiative. XII It is worth mentioning Mario Albertini's stance, who, while rejecting the General's basic nationalist and confederalist orientation, believed until 1966 that some aspects of his policy objectively promoted progress towards European integration. See Albertini (1961 Albertini ( , 1962 Albertini ( , 1963 Albertini ( , 1966 and also Albertini (1964) , in which, unlike Altiero Spinelli's stance, he advocated the need for Europe's nuclear weapons. XIII Faure's appointment to the European Parliamentary Assembly (which changed its name to the European Parliament in 1962) took place in 1959 at the express will of Prime Minister Debré, despite the initial opposition of the Gaullist parliamentary group. However, according to Faure himself, his relationship with Debré was one of deep friendship, going beyond their divergent views on the evolution of the European unification process. Debré felt that appointing Faure was a duty, as he was an expert on Community institutions and did not consider their different views an obstacle. See Riondel (1997: 336) . XIV As for the OFME initiative, cf., ACIME, Fald. 36, b. EST/5-A -Bureau Exécutif International 1961 , doc. 39, Bureau Exécutif International -Réunion extraordinaire du 19 janvier 1962 ibid., Greek delegate Cassimatis also expressed very strong doubts about the idea of excluding France, at least temporarily, from the European integration process while involving Great Britain. He pointed out that this, in addition to being very controversial, would not allow them to avoid the risk of having to revise the Treaties. See ACIME (1965, ANSA nr. 199/2 ) . XIX "Those who seek loopholes regarding compliance with the treaties or come in the way of their implementation and development are the ones who seem to be "dividing Europe rather than uniting it," delaying the necessary construction of a Community of the peoples of Europe on a federal and democratic basis. We would have liked to avoid the sadness of now having to include you among the supporters of ideas that are the opposite of the ones you once disseminated. We were wrong."
